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ping, modern developments make the doctrine questionable. The old ar-
gument that it is fair to subject a voluntary visitor to local laws becomes
somewhat hollow when the voluntary entry into a jurisdiction amounts to
no more than an accidental fall in an aircraft. In this situation there is
such an insignificant relationship between the injured party and the place
of the injury that even the desirable advantage of certainty should yield
to considerations reflecting the real interests of the parties concerned.
Texas has moved in this direction by abandoning its prior refusal to ap-
ply the law of lex locus delicti because of its dissimilarity with that of the
forum. Perhaps this signals a recognition that the place of the tort should
not always be the controlling consideration in the adjudication of tort
claims arising outside the forum state.
R. Randall Bridwell
Negligence- Financial Institution's Liability
to Borrower's Customers
Defendant, Great Western Savings and Loan Association, provided most
of the money for a one-hundred-acre housing development in California.
When house buyers suffered economic loss from construction defects, they
sought recovery for the negligence of both the savings and loan association
and its borrower, a corporation capitalized at $5,000 by two men with no
experience in large-scale tract development.' The savings and loan associa-
tion's financial involvement was three-pronged: it purchased the land and
later resold it to its borrower; it made construction loans after the houses
were presold from a model set up. on the tract; and it exercised a right of
first refusal on first trust deed financing for most of the approximately 2 50
house buyers. It could be inferred that the savings and loan association
committed financing before receiving financial statements or customary
feasibility studies from its borrower's inexperienced organizers. The sav-
ings and loan association's involvement further included approval of its
borrower's house plans, which lacked features to compensate for the ex-
pansive nature of the tract's soil. Houses on the tract were heavily dam-
aged,' probably' when soil expansion cracked their foundations. The say-
'The issues at the trial's first phase were: "[1. whether] a principal-agent, joint venture, or
joint enterprise relationship existed between the (two defendants]; [2. if not] whether Great West-
ern had any independent duty to [the house buyers]; and [3] whether Great Western . . . com-
mitted fraud upon which it could be liable." Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333,
341 (Ct. App. 1967). The court held against the plaintiffs on the first issue, for them on the sec-
ond, and did not reach the third.
' Details of the land purchase are at 61 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38. The total original acquisition cost
was $340,000, of which the development company put up $190,000, and the savings and loan
association $150,000. Four months later and for $180,000, the borrower took title under an option
from the savings and loan association.
'The houses sold for about $15,000 each, and they were damaged to the extent of about forty
per cent of their value. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
'Since the appeal was from a nonsuit, the court "[disregarded] conflicting evidence, [gave] to
the plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, and [indulged] in every legiti-
mate inference which may be drawn from that evidence." 61 Cal. Rptr. at 341. The court's lengthy
discussion of the soil indicates its inference of causation.
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ings and loan association could have known of the soil condition, since it
had a representative on the construction site.'
At trial, house owners were nonsuited with respect to the defendant sav-
ings and loan association. Held, reversed and remanded: The savings and
loan association might have breached an independent duty to house owners
to avoid gross structural defects in the houses of a residential subdivision
it almost totally financed. Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co., 61
Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1967).
I. CURRENTS OF CALIFORNIA LAW
House owners who suffer loss from construction defects fare differently
from state to state as to available theories and sources of recovery.' In Cali-
fornia, the use of a negligence theory to recover from a financial institu-
tion emerges from the availability of negligence recoveries from building
contractors, from exceptions to a rule involving "economic harm," and
from a broad policy framework for judicial decisions on duty in negligence
7
cases.
Negligence Actions Against Builders. Traditional objections to the imposi-
tion of negligence liability on builders include the difficulty of discovering
defects and consequent long time lapses before actions are brought. A 1948
California case' emphasized that these objections dealt only with fact
questions which were merely obstacles to any particular recovery.' That
case began the recognition of builders' negligence liability by categorizing
construction features as "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril"
when negligently made.' A personal injury case thus opened the door to
builders' negligence liability, but later decisions allowed recoveries for
property damage alone. In Ste-wart v. Cox" the owner of a negligently con-
structed swimming pool recovered for both damage to surrounding prop-
erty and damage to the pool itself. In a later case, Sabella v. Wisler," a con-
tractor was held liable for damage which occurred only in the negligently
'The expansive soil is "readily distinguishable by the naked eye . And the savings and
loan association also had a water supply study which referred to the dryness of the soil. 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 339.
aSee Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 MiNN.
L. REV. 108 (1953); Gibson & Lownsberry, Implied Warranties-Sale of a Completed House, 1
CAL. W.L. REV. 110 (1965); Note, Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation, 19 MODERN L.
REv. 544 (1956). See also Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d $44, 553
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
The Texas rule is announced in Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). A con-
tractor was liable for breach of implied warranty of good workmanlike construction and suit-
ability for human habitation. The court notes that "in Texas, the notion of implied warranty
. . . is considered to be a tort rather than a contract concept." Id. at 556. The court cites the
Connor case, id. at 161.
' Strict liability in tort has not been imposed on builders in California, but that result has
been predicted in two jurisdictional surveys. Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Prod-
ucts: The Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L.R. 30, 57 (1965); Prosser, Strict Liability
to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 29 (1966).
'Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 3 (1948).
'See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, LAw oF TORTS 1043 (1956).
"Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 3 (1948).
11 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961).
59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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made property. The general contractor in Sabella negligently compacted
soil around the foundation of a house he built with no particular purchaser
in mind. The court held that the builder's negligence liability was for major
defects only."'
The Economic Harm Limitation. The property damage compensated in
Sabella may be characterized as "economic harm,"' which is purely pecun-
iary or loss-of-value injury, as distinguished from harm to the person or
damage to one's property inflicted by another. In California," as else-
where, courts admit reluctantly the use of negligence as a basis for com-
pensating economic harm.' A California Supreme Court opinion notes that
"[e]ven in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss
alone.""
The economic harm limitation may be seen merely as a preference for
the use of warranty or contract law in cases where "economic harm" may
be equated with loss of bargain."' Or it may be considered an expression of
judicial caution" in cases where liability for economic harm might be in an
"indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."" Another explanation for the limitation is that it results from "his-
torical accident": pecuniary interests standing alone have not ranked high
in the priority of interests protected by the common law."1 This historical
relative disinterest of the common law has afforded some immunity from
negligence actions to entities such as lenders, whose activities likely will
affect only pecuniary interests.
California courts have maintained the economic harm limitation in sit-
uations where a warranty might exist,"' but they have relaxed the limita-
tion in other cases. There is a specific exception to the limitation in actions
by house owners against negligent builders,2" but this exception does not
affect the practical immunity which the limitation bestows on the entities
mentioned above. However, that practical immunity was weakened in
California by Biakanja v. Irving,' in which a notary was held liable to per-
sons not in privity for negligently preparing a will which would have bene-
fited the plaintiffs but for his negligence. Biakanja has broad language
1s27 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
14The phrase is borrowed from Seavey, Actions for Economic Harm-A Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1243 (1957).
" See Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Wyatt v.
Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956).
"The best general discussion is in Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas d Co., Negligent Mis-
representation by Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466 (1951). See also Seavey, supra note 14.
"€ The statement is dictum in a case of strict liability in tort, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
" See Prosser, supra note 7, at 3 5; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Detective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1965).
19 Seavey, sura note 16, at 474.
2 ' Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (Ct. App. 1931).
21 Seavey, supra note 16, at 473.
2See cases cited note 15 supra.
"Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
2449 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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which has been taken to reopen for California the question of the com-
pensability of economic harm."
"Duty" and Public Policy. The breadth of Biakanja lies in its description
of the factors relating to rulings on the possible existence of a duty, the
breach of which would be negligent conduct. The possible existence of a
duty is first a question of law," and it is a question touched by "various
and sometimes delicate policy judgments."' These policy considerations
were mentioned in Biakanja: 'The extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
the closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
injury; moral blameworthiness of defendant's conduct; preventative poli-
cies. "" A later opinion' mentions such factors as the social usefulness of
the injurious activity, the kind of person with whom a defendant may be
dealing, the workability of a rule of care, and parties' relative abilities to
bear the financial burden of injury.
II. CONNOR V. CONEJO VALLEY DEVELOPMENT Co.
No prior case has been found which is similar in facts and result to
Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co.' Yet it is suggested that the re-
sult in Connor, while unprecedented, is not unprincipled, for the case rep-
resents a convergence of several currents of California law.
From existing remedies for house owners against builders, 1 Connor draws
the availability of negligence actions to compensate losses resulting from
construction defects. Earlier objections to the use of negligence theory for
such recovery have been overcome by making traditional difficulties mere-
ly obstacles of proof for any particular recovery." Connor iterates the rule
that recoveries for negligence are limited to damage resulting from major
defects.1 The court wrote, "[n]or do we hereby suggest that the ... re-
sponsibility should cover the repair of every leaky faucet, sagging door or
hap-hazard paint job."
Connor rests on California precedents" which delineate a broad judicial
function in determining the possible existence of a duty in negligence
cases. To support the holding that a duty might exist, the opinion in
Connor spells out strong policy arguments, which include, appropriate to
negligence theory, the moral blameworthiness of the savings and loan as-
23For an interpretation of Biakanja v. Irving, id., in conjunction with Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (Ct. App. 1931), see Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal. Rptr.
727 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
The supreme court held that an attorney's mistake in dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities was
not negligence.
2W. PNossER, LAw op Tors 207 (3d ed. 1964).
27Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 28 CaL App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (1963).
2849 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
" Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (1963).
"61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1967).
s' See text accompanying notes 8-13 suPra.
'e text accompanying note 9 supra.
3"See text accompanying note 13 supra.
34 61 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
85 See notes 27-3 0 supra, and accompanying text.
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sociation, particularly in that aspect of its conduct relating to an "insub-
stantial and inexperienced" building contractor." The opinion mentions
the desirability of extending effective remedy to house owners who are "un-
informed,"" who deal on no real bargaining basis for mass-produced
homes,"s whose purchase represents a crucial investment of a large part of
their incomes,' and who may be otherwise remediless." The decision also
rests on policies preventive of shoddy construction in an area where resi-
dential development can take place very quickly.' Yet the opinion pre-
sents no explicit rationale for the decision's surprising turn, which is that
a financial institution can be liable for major construction defects custo-
marily associated with other enterprises.'s The Connor opinion relies on
Biakanja v. Irving's for its policy-based decision that a duty might exist.
Connor might also have looked to that case as precedent for attaching li-
ability to an entity, such as a savings and loan association, once indirectly
immunized by the limitation against compensating economic harm caused
by negligence."
Two qualifications attend the innovative rule of Connor. The first is
that lenders must exercise a certain amount of control before a duty such
as Great Western's may be held to exist. Great Western's control included
the opportunity to approve or disapprove the plans for its developer's
houses. In a wider sense, control seems to have been inferred when the
court characterized the savings and loan association as the developer's "in-
dispensable accomplice" and the "energizing force' behind the tract
development. The court stated that "[t]he degree of [a lender's] responsi-
- 61 Cal. Rptr. at 340, 344.
8rld. at 344.




4sSince MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. '382, Ill N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916),
courts have faced a notable problem in deciding which entities will bear the burden of injury where
a constellation of entities are connected with an injurious event. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1963). The problem seems to have
been more acute in enterprise liability theory, with its economic rationale, than in negligence theory
with its fault rationale and attendant individualistic overtones. Cf. Calabresi, Some Tboughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961), for an economic approach; A.
EHENZWEIG, NEGIGENCE WrrHoUT FAULT (1951), a short treatise setting out the theory of
enterprise liability and contrasting it with traditional negligence theory; and this language by a
California writer on strict liability in tort:
[ilt is submitted that any person or organization who is engaged in the business
of manufacture and/or distribution, and who plays any but a random and accidental
role in that enterprise is a proper defendant . . . . The practices of the particular
industry will be material to the number of defendants who may properly be joined,
and their number will multiply with the necessity for financial responsibility and
amenability to service.
Lascher, supra note 7, at $5, $6. The opinion writer in Connor mixed freely his citations to cases
of negligence and strict liability in tort, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 344, but the holding in the case is as to
negligence, id.
4349 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
"See text accompanying notes 22, 25 supra.
45 61 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
"id. at 347, quoting Lercoe & Dobson, Sasings Associations as Land Developers, 71 YALE
L.J. 1271, 1282 (1966).
47 61 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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bility should be measured inversely proportional to the degree of experi-
ence, skill, and responsibility of the [borrower-developer]. '"4
The second qualification is that the duty imposed on financial institu-
tions by Connor arises only in mass market situations. Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons,"' a New Jersey case from which the Connor opinion draws heavily,
applies on its face, and by later interpretations," to mass market situations
only. The Connor opinion notes that the impersonality of mass merchan-
dising weakens a house buyer's propensity or ability to protect himself
through equal-strength bargaining." For strict liability theory the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has renounced this "rationale [which rests] on the
analysis of financial strength or bargaining power of the parties."'' But the
renunciation of this rationale for strict liability theory does not imply that
factors such as relative bargaining power are irrelevant in negligence cases.
While negligence remains fault-related," those factors are part of determin-
ing where fault lies.
III. CONCLUSION
Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co." is an orderly but lively
development in common law." The decision is an extension and converg-
ence of two lines of precedents, one" dealing with house owners who suffer
economic harm from construction defects, the other defining and enlarg-
ing the scope of duty in negligence cases." The case is an appropriate one
for recognizing a duty in an entity once immunized by the economic harm
limitation for negligence liability." The duty, and its accompanying pos-
sible liability, is limited as to potential plaintiffs by a determinate group of
house buyers." The liability is limited in amount by the difficulties which
long time lapses will bring." The defendant savings and loan association is
an entity usually affecting only intangible, pecuniary interests, but its busi-
ness is closely associated with a tangible product. Only a short step is taken




944 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
"Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62, 229 A.2d 823, 826 (Super. Ct. 1967); Controy v. 10
Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415, 418 (Super. Ct. 1967).
5' 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
5' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 150 (1965).
aSee Traynor, supra note 1S, at 376.
61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1967).
Immediately after citing the Connor case, the Texas Supreme Court observed that "[tihe
common law is not afflicted with the rigidity of the law of the Medes and Persians 'which altereth
not .... ' Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. 1968).
56 See text accompanying notes 8-14 supra.
57 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supa.
"' See text accompanying notes 21, 24 supra.
19 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 8, 20 supra.
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